In Belgium, welfare agencies receive a subsidy to employ welfare recipients for a period sufficiently long to entitle them to unemployment benefits. This work experience program is called Social Employment (SE). We investigate the effect of SE on the exit rate from welfare. We propose a grouping/IV estimator of the SE effect that eliminates selection bias. The estimator is consistent, even if the selection into SE depends on the average unobserved characteristics of welfare recipients in a region and in a welfare duration interval. The empirical analysis suggests that there is creaming in the selection process. Without correction for selectivity we find that SE reduces welfare dependence, but after correction this conclusion is reversed. These results are consistent with the adverse incentives faced by the welfare agencies.
Introduction
In this study, we evaluate the effectiveness of a public sector work experience program, the Belgian Social Employment (SE) program. Economists have argued that work experience programs can reduce long-term unemployment by countering the discouragement, the loss of work habits, and the skill deterioration induced by a long spell of inactivity (cf. e.g. Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991) . A prerequisite for the effectiveness of a work experience program is that the responsible agencies foster the reemployment of inactive workers. In Belgium, the local welfare agencies (WA) that are in charge of SE, not only run the program, but they also provide community services, as services to nursing homes, hospitals and homes for the elderly, and meals and cleaning services for households in need of support. We argue below that, as employers, the WA have an incentive to select the most productive welfare recipients for SE and no incentive to stimulate their re-employment.
Not only the program administrators but also the participants in SE face adverse incentives that may offset the beneficial effect of improved work habits. First, participants in SE earn the minimum wage, and thus have a significantly higher income than nonparticipants. This increases the wage at which they are willing to accept a regular job.
Second, participants who remain in SE until the statutorily defined end-date are automatically entitled to unemployment benefits that are higher than welfare allowances and not means-tested. Finally, job search effort could be directly affected, if it is harder to search for a regular job while participating in SE.
The fact that the WA are likely to assign more employable welfare recipients to the program complicates the estimation of the SE effect on the exit rate from welfare, because even without the program SE participants would have a better position on the labor market. Moreover, the effect of a work experience program may be smaller for more employable recipients (see Gueron and Pauly 1991) . To evaluate the program we need a procedure to correct for selection bias. Research by Ashenfelter and Card (1985) , LaLonde (1986) , and Fraker and Maynard (1987) has cast doubt on the ability of nonexperimental methods to correct for selection bias. Estimates are sensitive to the model specification and the estimation method. Recently, Dehejia and Wahba (1999) have shown that in the National Supported Work (NSW) training program, studied before by LaLonde (1986) , the selection bias is mainly determined by observable variables.
Conditioning on these variables (or the probability of selection) removes the selection bias 1 . This requires the availability of high quality and comparable data on both participants and non-participants, in particular data on the pre-program labor market histories of both groups. Participants and non-participants should also be recruited from the same local labor markets (Heckman et al. 1998 ).
Unfortunately, the data used in our evaluation do not contain the variables that make the participants and non-participants comparable. We therefore follow another strand in the evaluation literature that identifies the program effect from exogenous variation in program participation (see Meyer 1995 or Angrist and Krueger 1999 for a survey). In particular, we use Angrist's (1991) observation that if participation is selective at the individual level, aggregation may reduce or even eliminate selectivity, if variation in the participation rate at the aggregate level is exogenous 2 . The grouping estimator was first proposed by Wald (1940) to deal with measurement error. Durbin (1954) showed that the Wald estimator is an Instrumental Variable (IV) estimator.
In our study, we group the data by duration class and region. This yields a consistent estimator of the effect of SE if the participation rate is not correlated with the average characteristics of the welfare recipients grouped by duration interval and region 3 .
This assumption may not hold in our application. Because the WA may be aware of the variation of the average unobserved characteristics with the elapsed duration of welfare, there may be a correlation between the average unobserved characteristics by duration interval and the participation fraction. However, we include indicators of the duration intervals (and of the region 4 ), and this eliminates the correlation, at the expense of a reduced variation in the participation fraction that is now in deviation of the mean by duration interval (and by region).
We estimate the effect of SE on the rate of leaving welfare. In other words, the response variable is the welfare duration. Unless we impose restrictive distributional 1 Heckman et al. (1998) find that conditioning on a similar set of variables does not remove all of the bias in an evaluation of the JTPA program and propose a conditional (on the propensity score) differences-in-differences method to remove any remaining selection on bias. 2 Angrist (1991) uses this approach to deal with the endogenous wage in a labor supply equation. He aggregates waves in the PSID to the national level and this aggregation replaces individual wages by average wages. 3 Note that this is perfectly consistent with selectivity at the individual level. To see this, assume that there are two types of welfare recipients and that the type with favorable characteristics is more likely to be selected for SE. Such a composition of welfare recipients within a group is irrelevant at the group level.assumptions and censoring is not important, an IV estimator is not consistent in models for duration data 5 . Grouping solves this problem, since we can then base estimation on the Minimum Chi-Square (MCS) method. The MCS method justifies estimation on the linearized duration model (Cockx, 1997) . Without further assumptions on the variation of the program effect in the population, the probability limit of an IV estimator is not equal to the average effect of the program. In general, an IV estimator gives the effect of SE for marginal participants 6 (Imbens and Angrist, 1994) . The IV estimator gives the usual average program effect for participants, if the program effect does not vary among participants or if the variation in the program effect does not influence the decision to participate in the program (Heckman and Robb 1985 , p.196, Heckman and Smith 1996 , p.59-68, Heckman 1997 . We test the latter assumption and show that it cannot be rejected for our data. Krueger (1990) , Meyer (1989) , and Meyer, Viscusi and Durbin (1990) analyzed duration data that were generated by a natural experiment. Their approach cannot be used in the evaluation of SE. First, because of censoring, restrictive distributional assumptions must be imposed (see Krueger 1990, p.14) . Second, their approach cannot account for time-varying explanatory variables. They assume that individuals are selected into the program prior to entry into the state of interest. WA, however, employ and therefore select welfare recipients at some instant during the welfare spell. The participation indicator is therefore time varying.
In the following section we discuss the main features of the institutional setting.
We compare it to the institutional setting of work experience programs in other countries and argue that adverse incentives for administrators of the kind discussed in this paper can explain the ineffectiveness of these programs in other countries as well. In Section 3 we describe the data and provide a benchmark of the program effect on the basis of a matching estimator. Section 4 presents the statistical model, justifies the identifying assumption and presents the baseline results. Section 5 discusses the robustness of the results. The final section contains the conclusions.
Social Employment and its Relevance for other Work-Experience Programs

Social Employment
In Belgium the welfare system is a safety net for those who are not covered by social insurance, because of insufficient work experience, delay in administrative procedures, or because they have been punished by the social insurance administration. Individuals, who pass a means test, can claim a supplement to their income up to the legally determined Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG) at the welfare agency (WA) of their municipality.
During the 1987-90 period on average 52,659 adults and 31,672 children received the MIG at any given time (Cockx 1992, p.36) . This is roughly 0.8% of the Belgian population. To compare, in January 1989, 389,672 individuals received Unemployment Insurance benefits (Cockx 1992, p.39) . The number of welfare recipients is relatively small, because unemployment insurance benefits have an indefinite duration 7 . After a waiting period of six months, even school-leavers are entitled to unemployment insurance benefits.
Legislation stipulates that WA may employ welfare recipients for a period that is sufficiently long 8 to entitle them to unemployment benefits. This type of employment is called Social Employment (SE). During the 1987-90 period on average 1282 individuals received SE at each instant of time. This is 2.4% of the adult welfare population.
The possibility to employ welfare recipients for this purpose brought legislation into agreement with the principle that social assistance offers relief only if the main social insurance system fails to do so. The national and regional 9 authorities have gradually widened the scope of SE as a means of enhancing the integration of the poor. This is reflected in increased financial support to WA offering SE. The regional authorities subsidize SE in Flanders since 1983 and in the Walloon provinces since 1989. The central 7 There is one exception to this rule. Cohabitants who are not the head of a family can lose entitlement to unemployment benefits on grounds of "excessive" duration. 8 Unemployment benefits are only paid to workers who, within a specified period prior to their claim, have been employed for at least 75 days if younger than 18, and up to 600 days if older than 50 (Van Langendonck 1991, p. 450) . 9 Readers who are familiar with the Belgian institutional setting will notice that we use regional in a loose sense. As such, we can divide Belgium into 4 regions: Flanders, referring to the Flemish (Dutch) speaking community in the North; the Walloon provinces, referring to the French speaking community in the South; Brussels, referring to the region of the bilingual community of the capital city; the German speaking community in the East. Given the marginal importance of the latter region, we ignore it in the sequel. authorities finance 50% of the MIG paid by the local WA. Since 1985 the WA remain entitled to this subsidy if it socially employs the welfare recipient, and since January 1993 the subsidy is up to 100% of the MIG.
It is important to realize that the WA receive this financial support and not the employed welfare recipients. SE participants are paid the minimum wage, so that they earn at most as much as in an alternative job. Incentives for a welfare recipient to participate in SE are therefore, either the (possibly higher) unemployment benefits to which he/she is entitled after SE, or the (subjective) benefits of the work experience.
These incentives are not the sole determinants of participation, for the WA can mandate participation, as the receipt of welfare benefits is conditional on the willingness to work. Van de Velde (1989) demonstrates that SE is concentrated in the community services that the WA offer to the general public. These community services consist of domestic services to households, such as care, meal provision, cleaning, and to institutions, i.e. nursing homes, hospitals, homes for the elderly, etc. These jobs require few qualifications. Women are typically (95%) employed in the domestic services provided by the WA. This work involves cleaning, cooking, washing and ironing. Men are required to do all kinds of odd jobs (37%), to maintain roads or to plant vegetation (13%), to help in the kitchen (10%), to do administrative work (10%) (see Van Moreover, during the initial period of SE, in which the participant would otherwise depend on welfare, the WA no longer needs to pay welfare benefits and therefore saves at least 11 50% of the MIG (=8,152 B.F.) minus the regional subsidy for welfare (=1,141 B.F.) , that is 7,011 B.F. This implies that employing a worker, who initially produces goods and services with a value of more than 3,691 B.F. per month and later on of more than 10,702 B.F. per month, is financially attractive to the WA. The WA needs not worry 10 The figures in the example are taken from an internal document of a WA to which we had access. 11 WA's can offer a supplement to the MIG, but they do not receive a subsidy for this supplement. about costs after SE, because after SE welfare recipients are entitled to unemployment benefits, and hence will not depend financially on the WA. We conclude that SE can result in savings for WA. These savings are larger if the WA select the most productive recipients for participation in the program.
This observation is not only valid for the specific example. However, the size of the savings differs with the level of the MIG 12 , the time period and the region. For instance, Brussels does not provide a specific subsidy for SE and due to the growing popularity of the program in Flanders, the subsidy per participant has declined. In the case of a lower subsidy the WA can still save on expenses by being more selective in the choice of participants. The specific subsidy rules provide no incentive to the WA to use SE to integrate welfare recipients in the labor market. Efforts to this effect will only increase its expenditures. Consequently, the findings of Van de Velde 1990, p. iv, that SE was hardly accompanied by training and assistance and that the WA encouraged only 6% of the participants to apply for another job, are not surprising.
Comparison with Other Work Experience Programs
In other European countries, program administrators face similar adverse incentives. For instance, in Germany the dramatic rise in unemployment since the early nineties has increased the number of welfare recipients substantially. In response, several municipalities, like Leipzig, Frankfurt and Lübeck, now offer temporary employment to welfare recipients in municipal job-creation companies, the so-called "Beschäftigungsgesellschaften". Feist and Schöb (1999) argue that municipalities can benefit from these initiatives for reasons similar to those in Belgium. First, the jobcreation companies provide local public goods. Second, after being employed for a year the participants are entitled to unemployment insurance benefits of the "Bundesanstalt für Arbeit", a federal authority. Consequently, the German municipalities have similar adverse incentives as the WA in Belgium 13 .
12 The level of the MIG differs by household type. Legislation distinguishes between singles living alone, singles living with dependent children, cohabiting individuals and cohabiting married couples. 13 We are not aware of any study evaluating this program. Eichler and Lechner (1998) find that public employment programs reduce the unemployment risk for participants in the East German State of Sachsen-Anhalt. However, this study could not distinguish employment in the municipal Beschäfti-gungsgesellschaften from other public employment programs.
The British Youth Training Scheme (YTS) of the second half of the eighties provides an example in which private employers face adverse incentives. Participants in the YTS are placed in a job where they can acquire work experience. Trainees were paid an allowance (set slightly above the unemployment benefits level) and firms could employ trainees without incurring any further wage costs. As the WA in Belgium, firms could therefore gain from cheap labor. Moreover, firms did not have explicit incentives to increase the employability of trainees. The work experience was supplemented by classroom training, but one can have serious doubts on the quality of this training component, as this was a constant theme in discussions of reform. Dolton et al. (1994) find that ex-trainees obtain jobs at a slower rate than non-trainees even when the time spent in YTS is excluded 14 .
Work experience programs that place participants in jobs that do not require much training induce (public or private) employers to hang on to the participants for the subsidy period. After this period, employers, who have not invested in the participants, have little incentive to keep them. For example, Edin and Holmlund (1990) report that participation in temporary jobs in the public sector in Sweden decreases the re-employment rate of young and displaced workers 15 . Bonnal et al. (1997) find that in France lower educated young workers participating in public employment programs do not have a higher transition rate from unemployment to employment after program participation. Moreover, participation decreases this transition rate for workers with a professional or technical diploma 16 .
The SE program is, at first sight, comparable to the workfare programs in the US, e.g. aimed at women who receive Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) (see Gueron 1990 , Gueron and Pauly 1991 , Moffitt 1992 and LaLonde 1995 . Typically, welfare applicants or recipients are required to look for a job for two to four weeks. If they do not find a job, participants may be required to work for up to three months without pay (workfare). Usually, these are entry-level jobs in public or nonprofit 14 Female (but not male) ex-trainees obtain 'good' jobs at a faster rate than non-trainees when time spent on YTS is excluded. 15 The authors do find that program participation reduces the length of subsequent unemployment spells. However, the study imposes strong parametric (Weibull) restrictions on the baseline hazard and does not explicitly account for selection on unobservables, which may bias the results. 16 According to the authors, the latter finding suggests that participation in such programs may signal low job performance agencies, e.g. maintenance, clerical, park upkeep, or human services functions. Monthly working hours are equal to the welfare grant divided by the hourly minimum wage rate.
The US workfare programs, however, differ from SE in important respects. First, both participants and program administrators face different incentives in the two programs. Second, most US programs are not pure work experience programs, but also include job-search assistance, education or training components. A welfare recipient on workfare earns no more than the welfare benefits. The participant is therefore worse off by participating, because his/her time costs are not compensated. Contrary to SE, workfare therefore makes it more attractive to leave the welfare rolls. The US welfare and workfare programs are administered by the states, but subsidized by the Federal Government. In contrast to the SE-program, the funding rules of the US Federal Government, as determined by the Family Support Act (FSA) of 1988, provide incentives for enhancing the employability of program participants (see Gueron and Pauly 1991, pp. 55-59 for a more extensive discussion). The rules for matching grants contain provisions that prevent states from using workfare as cheap labor. Finally, contrary to SE in Belgium, welfare recipients who do not exit to a regular job, return to welfare, and increase the state's welfare expenditures. Despite these differences, the finding of this paper that SE increases rather than reduces welfare dependence is not in conflict with the evaluations of US workfare programs. First, there is limited and inconsistent evidence on the effect of pure unpaid work experience: Studies have problems in disentangling the independent effects of each of a sequence of program components. Nevertheless, one finding is robust. No effect is found, when resources are so limited that staff can provide almost no direct assistance. As participants in SE hardly receive any assistance, this is in line with our results.
A noteworthy example of a successful work experience program is the National Supported Work (NSW) demonstration targeted at extremely disadvantaged welfare recipients 17 . In contrast with other work experience programs, NSW offered highly structured, full-time work experience positions for up to 18 months with close supervision and peer group support (Gueron and Pauly 1991, p.101) . Hollister, Kemper and Maynard (1984) and Grossman, Maynard and Roberts (1985) give evidence that participation in NSW led to a sizable earnings increase for former AFDC recipients, and 17 NSW was not only offered to AFDC women, but also to disadvantaged youth. Evaluation studies do not find that it significantly reduced the probability of being on welfare. Couch (1992) shows that the initial positive earnings effect is even maintained 8 years after the program.
The experience with NSW is similar to that of SE pilot projects in Belgium evaluated by Wouters, Van Meensel and Nicaise (1994) . In these pilot projects work experience is complemented by training and intensive assistance. Wouters, Van Meensel and Nicaise find that these projects increase the employment rates, even in the long run.
The Data
We analyze administrative data on recipients of the MIG that have been collected since June 1987 by the Ministry of Social Integration. From these data we calculate the length of welfare and SE spells (in days 18 ) for all MIG recipients, who claim benefits after June 1st 1987. In the analysis we consider only spells that started in the period June 1987 -July 1990. On July 1st 1990 additional measures to stimulate the re-employment of welfare recipients were introduced. We only consider welfare recipients who were younger than fifty at the start of the welfare spell.
Our data do not allow us to distinguish between exits to regular employment and other states. Hence, a positive effect of SE on the total exit rate from welfare need not correspond to a larger transition rate to regular employment. For example, Dehaes (1994, p.119 and 128) found that 26% of the exits involve a change in labor market status 19 , 35% involve entitlement to other social benefits, 19% a move to another municipality, 11% a change in the family composition 20 , 4% a withdrawal of benefits by the WA, and finally 4% other reasons. Table 1 summarizes some characteristics of the population under consideration.
As the data were collected for administrative purposes and not for analysis, the information is limited. The first column refers to all welfare spells, the second to those spells in which some time was spent in SE.
INSERT TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE
positive short-or long-term effects for the latter group (cf. Hollister et al. 1984 and Couch 1992) . 18 In Table 2 we express statistics in months by dividing the number of days by 30.4375.
In contrast to Garcia (1990) we do not find an age difference between SE participants and non-participants. This is a consequence of the restriction to welfare recipients younger than fifty. On the other hand, the over-representation of women among the socially employed is confirmed. In addition, individuals who are legally married but living alone are over-represented among the participants in SE. Furthermore, participants are more likely to have dependent children. The rate of participation in SE is larger in small municipalities and in Flanders.
INSERT FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE
The median welfare spell is 5 months. This is somewhat smaller than the number reported in Cockx (1997) . The difference can be attributed to the exclusion of recipients older than fifty. Welfare spells of participants in SE are much longer. The median duration for this group is 13 months. Moreover, as can be seen from Figure 1 , the survival fraction of participants in SE is uniformly higher than that of non-participants.
From this we cannot conclude, that participation in SE increases welfare dependence.
First, as reported in Table 2 , the median duration until selection into SE is 6 months, and this increases the survival fraction of participants. However, even if we subtract the time until selection, the median duration of participants (=13-6=7 months) exceeds the median duration of all welfare spells. Second, if transitions from welfare exhibit negative duration dependence, the difference of the medians understates the effect, because the exit rates of participants are lower due to delayed entry in SE. Third, even at an equal elapsed duration, participants and non-participants differ in both observed and unobserved characteristics. This induces the well-known selection bias. Note that, if the WA indeed cream, i.e. select the best welfare recipients, the difference between the two survivor functions in Figure 1 under-rather than overestimates the impact of SE.
INSERT TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE
The finding that the median duration until selection into SE is larger than the median welfare duration seems to be evidence against the creaming hypothesis of Section 2. However, WA will not offer SE to welfare recipients who are likely to leave welfare shortly, because of the fixed costs associated with SE. As a consequence, SE is only offered to welfare recipients who have been on welfare for some period. The creaming hypothesis applies to this subgroup of the welfare recipients, which is a negative selection from all welfare recipients.
Some of the biases associated with a simple comparison of participants and nonparticipants in SE are reduced if we consider a matched comparison. Despite recent pessimistic evidence of the validity of matching methods (cf. Friedlander and Robins 1995) , the interest in their application has recently revived. Dehejia and Wahba (1995a,b) , for instance, reproduce, by matching on the probability of selection or propensity score, the treatment effect estimated by a randomized experimental design. This requires that the treatment assignment is independent of the outcome conditionally on observed variables 21 . The administrative data used in our study are clearly not rich enough. For this reason, the matching estimator gives only a benchmark estimate of the effect of SE on welfare duration. Rather surprisingly, however, the estimate found by this method are consistent with those found by the grouping/IV estimator proposed in Section 5 below.
Participants in SE are matched with non-participants on the basis of the characteristics reported in Table 1 . We only retain exact matches 22 . This explains the significantly lower number of individuals in the matched sample. In the matched sample, welfare recipients living in small municipalities are underrepresented. This should not come as a surprise, as the number of welfare recipients is much smaller in these municipalities, and consequently the probability of finding an exact match. For the same reason foreigners, widow(er)s, women, families with dependent children, married persons, and persons living in Flanders are underrepresented This feature can bias the matching estimator of SE to the extent that the treatment effect varies systematically with these characteristics. In Section 5 we argue that this is unlikely to be the case.
INSERT FIGURE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE
In order to account for the bias induced by the elapsed duration until selection, we match only to non-participants who are still on the rolls after the selection time of the SE participant. Moreover, as SE can only produce effects from the moment of enrollment, we subtract this elapsed duration from the welfare duration in both groups. In Figure 2 the survival functions of the welfare durations are plotted for participants and nonparticipants 23 . This shows that participants in SE are more likely to be on welfare for up to one year. Afterwards, they seem to be more likely to have left. This pattern is consistent with (i) a lower transition rate out of welfare of SE participants (in comparison to individuals who have been on welfare for the same time period) (ii) creaming of SE participants. Initially the lower transition rate dominates, but over time the positive selection into SE diminishes this effect among the survivors, and even reverses the effect 24 .
Dealing with Bias: Discrete Durations, Competing Risks and Unobservables
Nonrandom selection of participants leads to differences in the (average) characteristics of participants and non-participants. Part of this is due to the delay in selection into SE.
The matching procedure of the previous section makes the two groups comparable and eliminates the bias due to selection on observables and the delay in participation. It does not eliminate bias due to selection on unobservable characteristics, which as argued is potentially important in SE.
In this section we introduce a model for discrete duration data with competing risks that deals with both types of bias simultaneously. The competing risks specification allows for an arbitrary starting time in SE. In a first step, we control for even fewer observable characteristics then in the matching procedure. If our hypothesis of creaming in the selection process holds, this benchmark estimator of the effect of SE on the transition rate hazard out of welfare will be even more biased upwards. This is confirmed below. In a second step, we present the grouping/IV estimator that controls for selection on both observables and unobservables.
We group the observed durations by duration interval and explanatory variables.
The advantage of grouping is that we do not need parametric assumptions on the joint distribution of unobservables that affect both the participation decision and the transition rate out of welfare. Grouped durations can be modeled in continuous or in discrete time.
23 As a consequence of right censoring, we cannot simply take differences of durations between two matched individuals as a measure of the treatment effect. 24 We also matched the SE participants to non-participants in WA's that do not have welfare recipient in SE. This resulted in a somewhat larger matched sample. The results are the same as in Figure 2 .
Following Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) and Cockx (1997) we use time-aggregation in a continuous time proportional hazards model. In the resulting model the parameters are invariant to the grouping. After a simple transformation of the dependent variable, the model can be written as a (heteroskedastic) linear regression model.
Time-Varying Covariates and Competing Risks with Grouped Duration Data
Let the duration data be grouped into K+1 intervals:
In the simplest grouped duration model it is assumed (Prentice and Gloeckler 1979) that the (base-line) hazard λ is constant on these intervals
Let d (t ) be the indicator of participation in SE at t. In this section, we assume that the process of participation is exogenous, an assumption that will be relaxed later. Note that the time-scale is time spent on welfare. This is the time-scale used in the rest of this paper.
If we assume that the effect of SE on the exit rate is independent of t, then the exit rate h can be written as
This means that participation in an individual's SE status at time t leads to a proportional change in the baseline hazard that is equal to α . Let P k be the conditional probability of exit in the k-th duration interval [t k −1 , t k ) given that the individual is still on welfare at t k −1 .
With (1) and (2) we have
This probability depends on the evolution of d in the k-th duration interval. With grouped duration data this evolution is unknown. We could assume that exit from SE is only possible by leaving welfare and that all selection into SE occurs at time t k −1 . Then we only need to know the SE-status at the start of the k-th interval to determine P k , because the SE-indicator is constant on that interval. However, these assumptions are counterfactual, because individuals may leave SE and remain on welfare, and they may be selected into SE at any point during the welfare spell. For that reason we make the more reasonable assumption that there is at most one transition in a time interval.
Let θ 0 (t) , θ 1 (t ) be the transition intensities into and out of SE at welfare duration t. As in (1) we assume that these intensities are piece-wise constant, and θ 0 k , θ 1k are the values on the k-th interval. We condition on the SE-status at the beginning of the k-th interval. Let P k WSE ,OW be the conditional probability of leaving welfare in the k-th duration interval while being in SE until exit from welfare, given that the individual is on welfare and in SE at t k −1 25 . Analogously, let P k WNSE ,OW be the conditional probability of leaving welfare in the k-th duration interval while not being in SE until exit from welfare, given that the individual is on welfare and not in SE at t k −1 . These probabilities are transition probabilities in the k-th interval from the state welfare with SE (WSE) to the state out of welfare (OW) and from the state welfare without SE (WNSE) to the state out-of-welfare (OW). With (1) and (2) we have
In a similar way we obtain
The conditional probability of all other events is the complement of the sum of these probabilities.
For welfare recipients who are not in SE at the start of the k-th interval we have
The expressions (4)- (7) show that our model for selection into SE is equivalent to two competing risks models with piece-wise constant transition intensities: one for the origin state WSE and destination states OW and WNSE, and one for the origin state WNSE and destination states OW and WSE.
Modeling Grouped Durations with Competing Risks
It will be convenient to attach numbers to the three states introduced in Section 4.1 1. Welfare without SE 2. Welfare with SE
Out of welfare
In the sequel we identify the states by these numbers. We are interested in comparing the transition intensity from state 1 to state 3 with that from state 2 to state 3. This identifies the effect of SE on the exit rate from welfare. State 3 is assumed to be an absorbing state.
Our data do not contain multiple welfare spells.
Origin/destination states are indicated by superscripts u and v, and duration intervals and types of individuals by subscripts k and m, respectively. We make the following assumptions on the transition intensities between the states Finally, the ε km uv are unobserved variables, which are similar to the specification errors introduced by Amemiya and Nold (1975) in their grouped logit model (see also Parks 1980 ). If we consider these unobserved variables as parameters, we obtain a saturated model. In the sequel we impose restrictions on the unobserved variables, by assuming that they are draws from some distribution. The specification in (8) is a proportional hazard model for the continuous-time transition intensities.
The specification allows for unobserved heterogeneity in the transition intensities.
Unobservables may be important determinants of the transition intensities, because the number of included observed characteristics is small. Because unobservables may also be important for the selection into SE and correlation between unobservables in the transition intensities and in the selection process biases the estimate of the SE-effect, we must assess their contribution to the explanation of the transition intensities. Because the data are grouped, the unobservables vary between, but not within groups. Hence, the analogy between the group-specific unobserved heterogeneity in our model and the individual unobserved heterogeneity in continuously observed duration data is imperfect.
An important advantage of our approach is that it is not necessary to specify the distribution of the unobservables. An attempt to distinguish between the distribution of unobservables and duration effects may bias the estimate of the SE effect (see e.g. Baker and Melino 1999).
Under these assumptions the transition probability P km uv , i.e. the probability of a transition of an individual of type m from state u to state v in duration interval k, is equal 
Upon substitution of these estimates in the middle expression of (10), we obtain is defined in the Appendix. We may ignore the remainder of the Taylor expansion as it can be shown that its probability limit for r km u tending to infinity converges to zero at a faster rate than Upon substitution of (8) 26 The assumption that the omitted variables are random is analogous to the treatment of unobserved heterogeneity in duration (and other) models. The expectation is with respect to the distribution of the omitted variables.
The estimation results for model (15) are reported in 
INSERT TABLE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE
We obtain negative estimates for the variances of the unobserved group effects for the transitions from state 1 to state 2 and from state 2 to state 1. Following Parks (1980, p.299, footnote 5) we set these variances to 0. Hence, the unobserved group effects are set to 0. We only find an unobserved group effect in the transitions from welfare with SE and welfare without SE to out-of welfare.
The matching estimators of Section 4 suggested that SE decreases the exit rate from welfare. Table 3 , which corrects for the timing of selection and the resultant lower exit rate due to the duration dependence of the exit rate, leads to the opposite conclusion:
participation in SE increases the exit rate by a factor 1.25 (= exp(.224)). This difference can be explained by the fact that the matching estimator controls for more observable characteristics and hence reduces the selection bias induced by creaming. Nevertheless, both estimators are biased if selection in SE is based on unobservable characteristics. If this is the case, then the distribution of the unobserved determinants of the exit rates ε km uv depends on the type of transition. In particular, creaming implies that
ε , and as a result the effect of participation in SE is overestimated. The specification is rejected by the chi-square goodness-of-fit test.
Correcting for Selection on Unobservables
In this subsection we derive a grouping/IV estimator that corrects for selection on unobservables. We show that aggregation over the program participation indicator identifies the effect of SE under a weaker assumption than the one invoked in the previous section. The resulting estimator is a grouping estimator, similar to the estimator first proposed by Wald (1940) to deal with measurement error. Durbin (1954) showed that the Wald estimator is an IV estimator. Angrist (1991) used this estimator to estimate a labor supply equation with an endogenous wage rate, and in his application the instruments are year dummies. In our application the instruments are the region and duration class indicators.
27 Hence, the averaging does not result in an errors-in-variables problem as in Deaton (1985) .
The regression equation (18) includes region and duration class dummies, because we want to allow for differences in the exit rate from welfare by region and by welfare duration. As a consequence, the regressor in (18) The price for these weaker assumptions is that the variation in the residual participation rate km p is less than the variation in km p , and this increases the variance of the estimator. If we include interactions between region and duration class in (18), there is no variation, and (18) cannot be used for the estimation of the SE effect.
Although we can not estimate (18) The GLS estimates for regression equation (18) and the regression equations for the other transitions are reported in Table 4 . A comparison with the results in Table 3 shows that the parameter estimates for the destination states welfare without SE and welfare with SE are almost identical in the two tables. Also the duration effects in the transition intensity to the state out-of-welfare do not differ by much between these tables.
The only significant differences are in the regional effects and the effect of SE.
28 An alternative is to use difference-in-difference estimators where the differences are between duration intervals and regions. With our data these estimators are imprecise. Following Angrist (1991) we combine the difference-indifference estimates to increase the precision. Angrist's Efficient Wald estimator is our GLS estimator.
Eliminating unobserved differences between participants and non-participants makes the transition intensity to the state out-of-welfare significantly smaller in the Walloon provinces as compared to Flanders. This is reassuring given the structurally weaker economy of the Walloon Provinces. More importantly, the effect of SE is negative in Table 4 , while it was significantly positive in Table 3 . Note that the GMM test statistic only rejects at a significance level of more than 27%.
INSERT TABLE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE
Sensitivity Analysis
The standard error of the (efficient) GLS estimator of the SE-effect is relatively large.
Hence, it is important to investigate the sensitivity of this estimate to changes in the specification. First, we consider the use of (stochastic) prior information. Cockx (1992 Cockx ( , 1997 gives estimates of the regional effects on the hazard out of welfare. On the basis of his estimates, taking Brussels as the region of reference, we calculate 29 the following point estimates (and standard errors) for Flanders and the Walloon Provinces: .0541
(.0165) and -.0797 (.0170). Following Theil (1963) or Judge et al. (1985, p.58) , we impose these stochastic linear restrictions on the parameters in the estimation. The results are reported in Table 5 .
INSERT TABLE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE
The standard error of the effect of SE is smaller, and the point estimate becomes even more negative.
In the estimation we group the durations in a relatively small number of intervals, and we assume that the transition intensities are constant during these intervals. To investigate the sensitivity to the specification of the duration dependence we estimate (18) 29 Cockx (1992 Cockx ( ,1997 reports separate estimates for men and women and considers other regressors besides region.
The above point estimates were calculated by taking the appropriate transforms of the mixture of the duration distribution of men and women. As information on the covariances is not available, the standard errors are calculated by assuming a zero covariance between the estimated coefficients.
and the regressions for the other two transition intensities with 8 instead of 4 duration intervals. The results are reported in Table 6 .
INSERT TABLE 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE
Upon comparison with the estimates of Table 4 we conclude, that only the estimates of the duration effects differ between these two tables. In particular, the estimate of the SEeffect is similar to that in Table 4 . Note that the model now is rejected against the saturated model.
The estimates of Table 6 indicate that there is a problem with the specification.
We already noted that Brussels is rather different from Flanders and the Walloon provinces. We re-estimate the model with a separate duration dependence for Brussels.
The estimate of the SE-effect for this specification is reported in the column (1) of Table   7 .
INSERT TABLE 7 APPROXIMATELY HERE
The goodness-of-fit statistic improves considerably. The point estimate of the SE-effect is hardly affected and its standard error is significantly reduced.
During the 1987-90 period the demand for labor was rising, peaking in 1990. One may question to what extent the effect of SE is influenced by labor market conditions. In particular, the review of the literature suggests that work experience programs are more likely to be effective in periods of high labor demand (see e.g. Ridder 1986 ). To test this hypothesis we estimate a model that allows for a different the SE-effect for 1987-88 and for 1988-90. Column (2) of Table 7 reports the estimated SE-effects. The point estimates are both negative, and in line with expectations, less negative in the second sub-period.
Throughout this paper we have made the assumption of effect homogeneity. If the SE-effect varies among participants, then the grouping estimator does not estimate the effect of SE on the average participant, but rather the effect on the marginal participant.
There are two cases, in which the grouping estimator does estimate the usual effect on the average participant. Either the SE effect does not vary between participants or selection into the program is unrelated to the individual specific variation in the benefit difference between participation and non-participation, but is related to the average difference in benefits between these two options (Heckman and Robb 1985 , p. 196, Heckman and Smith 1996 , p.59-68, Heckman 1997 . If the SE effect varies between participants, then this induces within group unobserved heterogeneity in the exit rate. We perform two tests for the presence of unobservables in the exit rate.
It is well known (see e.g. Lancaster (1990), p.64-65) , that unobserved individual heterogeneity induces a trend towards 0 in the SE effect. Hence, the absence of such a trend, is an indication that within-group heterogeneity is not important. If we introduce a time-varying SE effect in model (15), correcting for selection on observables only, we find that the effect increases with duration.
Second, if within-group heterogeneity is important the hazard rate at a particular duration is known to depend on the hazard rates of the past. This suggests testing for within-group heterogeneity by checking whether the (weighted) residuals of our regression equation are autocorrelated. For this purpose we calculated the Durbin-
Watson and the (modified) Lagrange multiplier (LM) test statistic.
Denote the weighted residuals corresponding to the estimated regression model reported in Table 4 Table 6 lead to similar conclusions.
Conclusion
In this paper we estimate the effect of participation in social employment (SE) on welfare duration in Belgium. For this purpose we extend the Minimum Chi-Square approach that Cockx (1997) proposed for the analysis of grouped duration data. First, we show that the time-varying participation in SE can be modeled in a competing risks framework.
Secondly, by allowing for a specification error, that captures the effect of unobservables on the transition rates, we can study selection on these unobservables. The proposed estimator deals with the selection bias by aggregation to a level where the participation rate is exogenous. Inclusion of specific indicators eliminates the correlation between the participation rate and the average unobserved differences between regions and duration intervals. The resulting GLS estimator is efficient under these assumptions. The estimation results can be summarized as follows. If we correct for selection on observables only (Section 5.3, Table 3 ) participation in SE reduces the median welfare spell from 13.1 to 11.6 months 30 . The corresponding coefficient is significantly different from 0. If we correct for selection on unobservables, the change in the estimate of the SE effect suggests that there is substantial creaming in the selection process. Participation in SE is now reduces the exit rate from welfare, be it that the effect is not significantly different from 0. The median duration of a welfare spell is 12.5 months for nonparticipants and 14.8 months for participants in SE.
These results are in line with expectations. Welfare agencies (WA) face adverse incentives. Since the welfare recipient who is in SE will eventually become entitled to unemployment benefits, and will therefore no longer depend on the WA, the WA has no incentive to enhance the professional integration of the participants in SE. Moreover, since the SE is heavily subsidized, the WA, as an employer and provider of community services, has an incentive to keep welfare recipients in the program. With the current 30 These median durations refer to a welfare recipient in Flanders, who is selected into SE after 6 months.
incentives to the WA, welfare recipient do not benefit and are likely to be hurt by participation in SE. Moreover, international comparison of work experience programs reveals that adverse incentives for administrators of the kind discussed in this paper can explain the ineffectiveness of these programs in other European countries.
Appendix:
The system of SUR regression equations (13) In (14) (A.1) 
Estimation of SUR system (15)
Under assumption (16) which in particular implies that there are no unobserved differences in the exit rates of SE-participants ( 3 , 2 = = v u ) and non-participants V . This is a block diagonal matrix, which simplifies the computation of its inverse. Under the assumption that the model is correctly specified we
v follows a χ 2 -distribution with 4KM-3K-3(M-1)-1 degrees of freedom.
As the regression equations can be seen as a set of 4KM moment conditions, this statistic can be interpreted as a goodness-of-fit test statistic.
GLS estimation of the grouped regression equation (18)
In (15) In the second step we estimate the variance matrix (A.5) and estimate the parameters by GLS. ). * significant at the 10% level ** significant at the 5% level *** significant at the 1% level ). * significant at the 10% level ** significant at the 5% level *** significant at the 1% level ). * significant at the 10% level ** significant at the 5% level *** significant at the 1% level (1) GLS estimates of the parameters of the transition intensities with participation rate in SE instead of participation indicator, allowing the duration effects to be different in Brussels (2) GLS estimates of the parameters of the transition intensities with participation rate in SE instead of participation indicator: proportionality over calendar time and SE-effect varies over calendar time. The individuals are matched on year of birth, gender, nationality, number of children, marital status (see Table 1 for a definition), and WA. The welfare duration of non-participants is required to be greater than the elapsed duration of participants at the time of selection in SE. We redefine welfare duration by subtracting the time elapsed until selection in SE for each pair of matched individuals
